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Mutuals and co-operatives have long been, and remain, of interest to many scholars.  
Historians are well-equipped to offer insights into the institutional, social, economic, 
political and geographical contexts in which such organisations operate.  2012 is the 
United Nations Year of Co-operatives and a forthcoming special edition of Business 
History will feature articles on co-operatives. This special issue is dedicated to the 
history of financial institutions established and operated on a not-for-profit basis.  
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 There have been many recent contributions to the business history literature on 
such intermediaries. Pearson’s (2010) survey notes the historical importance of mutual 
organisations in providing various types of insurance service. Murphy’s (2010) study 
of life insurance in the antebellum US includes coverage of mutuals and Wright and 
Smith (2004) describe and explain the rise and demise of US mutual life insurers.  In 
Britain, chapters in O’Connell (2009) discuss formal and informal co-operative credit 
and the development of credit unions, a sector that remains very small in most 
countries.  Fear and Wadhwani (2011) contrast savings banks in Germany and the US.  
McLaughlin (2009; 2011) extends the empirical literature on regulatory capture in his 
examination of Irish microfinance institutions.  Guinnane and Martínez-Rodríguez 
(2011) argue that the co-operative legal form existed in Spain from 1869, earlier than 
commonly asserted, and that the development of co-operative law was closely tied to 
the development of company law, which echoes a major theme in the study of UK 
building societies by Noguchi and Bátiz-Lazo (2010). National and international 
networks of not-for-profit organisations have been shown to be important in 
sustaining the sector. Contributions here include that of Menzani and Zamagni (2010), 
who document the long-standing and continuing importance in the Italian economy of 
cooperatives both as individual organisations and in networked business groups.  In a 
similar vein, Bátiz-Lazo (2004) and Comín (2007) highlight the role of CECA, the 
confederation of Spanish savings banks (cajas), in sustaining the collective market 
share of these banks against commercial banks. 
 Our chief aim in this special edition is to provide a platform for contributions 
which extend the literature discussed in the previous paragraph.  The selected articles 
identify organisational forms and practices in need of attention, re-examine well-
studied organisational forms in a different light and move the research agenda forward 
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by pointing to promising subject areas. The remainder of this introductory article 
proceeds as follows. The next section offers our concept of not-for-profit-financial 
institutions. The third and fourth sections discuss the contents of this special edition. 
The fifth section briefly discusses a topic worthy of more attention from business 
historians: the relationship between the recent financial crisis and the reduction in 
diversity among financial intermediaries. The sixth and final section concludes. 
 
What is a not-for-profit financial institution?  
A first approach 
In broad terms, there are five features that distinguish the non-profit organisation or 
NGO
1
 and portray how it exists for the benefit of a specific community (Basri & 
Khalid, 2011, p. 4): 
 
a) Organised – there is structure and regularity to the organisation’s operations, 
whether it is formally incorporated or not. 
b) Private  – the organisation ‘... is barred from distributing any profits it earns 
to persons who exercise control over the firm, such as its members, officers, 
directors or trustees ... a nonprofit firm, by definition has no owners – that is 
no persons who have a share in both control and residual earnings’ 
(Hansmann, 1996, p. 228).  
c) Self-governing – internal governance mechanisms regulate the organisation’s 
behaviour. These can be both defensive and proactive rules and procedures. 
d)  Voluntary – membership and participation are not legally required or 
otherwise compulsory. 
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e) Transparent and accountable – an organisation has to demonstrate effective 
use of material and financial resources so that stakeholders can ascertain the 
force and legitimacy of their claims and judge their impact on society. This 
feature reflects a complexity in the relationship between the organisation and 
its stakeholders that goes beyond a purely economic or financial transaction. 
 
In this special edition we are mainly concerned with ‘private’ features of such 
organisations, those described by Hansmann (1996, pp. 1-2) as the ‘non-investor-
owned enterprise’, with ‘patrons’ rather than investors. Our emphasis is on 
organisations involving the deployment of resources (‘foundation’) rather than of 
individuals (‘association’) (Basri & Khalid, 2011, p. 3). But we consciously set out to 
go beyond this definition as Hansmann (1996, pp. 242-243) already acknowledges the 
blurring of these concepts in relation to the provision of financial services. 
 We use the term ‘not-for-profit financial institution’ (NFPFI) to refer to actual 
and potential participants in financial markets whose main purpose is not to make 
economic profits for distribution to external providers of capital or managers, but to 
meet other objectives.  These include the provision of financial services to particular 
customer groups not served by other institutions or to provide alternatives which are 
less expensive, better-suited to the needs of customers or managed in accordance with 
aims other than profit-maximisation.  Such objectives do not preclude the making of 
accounting profits (or surpluses), but where such profits are made they should be used 
in a manner consistent with these objectives.  This could include distributions to 
customers or members (who may be the same people, depending on the structure 
adopted), either in the form of cash, lower prices or a ‘social dividend’.2  
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 As financial intermediaries, NFPFIs have been systematically subjected to 
more intense government regulation than other NGOs. This seeks to protect ‘donors’ 
(e.g. retail depositors) and sometimes even dictates the nature of operations (e.g. in 
trustee-governed savings banks) while aiming for transparency and accountability. 
The roots of this regulation lay in financial markets permeated by incomplete and 
asymmetric information. A vast literature explores potential agency problems of 
conflict of interest and moral hazard in different markets and organisational forms. At 
its broadest, the agency problem in financial intermediation leads to two types of 
conflicts of interest: owner-customer, in which the interests of owners may be 
prioritised over customers, and owner-manager, in which managers indulge in 
‘expense preference’ behaviour or the pursuit of objectives such as growth, size and 
market share.  NFPFIs attempt to internalise the first of these conflicts by making 
customers the owners, eliminating the incentive for owners to take decisions which 
would damage customers’ economic interests.  The second conflict does not arise in 
the early stages of organisational development when owners are directly involved in 
management.  But as soon as decision-making is delegated to managers, monitoring 
becomes necessary to ensure efficient management in the wider interest and deter 
managerial opportunism.  This involves costs, thereby undermining the incentive for 
owners to exercise effective control, a problem frequently argued to be greater in 
mutual than joint-stock financial institutions, although depositors may prove effective 
monitors (Hollis & Sweetman, 2007). Economists such as Diamond (1984) and 
Casson (1997) stress efficiency in managing information costs, and here the not-for-
profit form may offer inherent benefits, such as informational efficiency in the 
screening and monitoring of lending and underwriting risks and the enforcement of 
obligations.  Such informational advantages can reduce risk, generating trust between 
 6 
members and in institutions.  Trust may also be generated through links to trusted 
organisations.  It is often argued that mutuals have advantages in dealing with long-
term risks subject to greater uncertainty where reliable information is lacking (see, for 
example, Wright, 2010a, and Wright & Smith, 2004). But in return, mutuals have to 
be perceived to be accountable.  
 Our broad definition of NFPFIs can include organisations legally constituted 
as ‘for-profit’, but which are de facto NFPFIs, not expected to make profits, and 
established for other purposes.  On this basis, the term NFPFIs may apply to a wide 
range of organisations, at least at some point in their development, for example: 
building societies; friendly societies; mutual or co-operative banks; credit unions; 
savings banks; community banks; thrifts or building/savings and loan associations; 
mutual insurers; and stock exchanges.  But we acknowledge that a strict definition of 
‘non-profit’ would be limited only to those ‘true’ non-profits which have no owners 
and where distributions of surpluses to controlling stakeholders are prohibited. 
 
NFPFIs: Endangered species or the dawn of a new organisational synthesis? 
The philanthropic or charitable origins of many NFPFIs reflect particular economic, 
social or ideological aims.  Many such organisations were founded and operated at a 
local level on a self-help basis, often to meet the needs of working class, low income, 
and sometimes immigrant, customers (see, for example, Wadhwani (2002) on the 
US’s first savings bank).  Regulation was designed to encourage conservative 
management and prevent conflicts of interest, while promoting the Victorian virtues 
of self-improvement and thrift to avoid dependence.  These institutions were typically 
intended to be self-governing and democratic.  They often had strong ties to their local 
communities and/or specific socio-economic, religious or ethnic groups, which helped 
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them to overcome the information asymmetries to which all financial intermediaries 
are subject.
3
  Such factors remain important to some NFPFIs, for example the 
‘affinity’ mutual insurers such as the NFU [National Farmers Union] Mutual and the 
Police Mutual Assurance Society which still exist in Britain. 
 Some institutions adopted not-for-profit form for commercial reasons later in 
their history to overcome potential conflict between shareholders with ownership 
rights and other stakeholders.  Other NFPFIs have emerged from market self-
regulation or the need to provide collective services, for example the creation of 
jointly-owned technology platforms such as Link, Cirrus and Tarjeta 6000 in retail 
payments and SWIFT in wholesale cross-border payments. 
 Although NFPFIs have long existed and remain important in many countries, 
their significance has diminished in other countries in which they were previously 
more prominent.  Many NFPFIs have merged together, mirroring consolidation among 
other financial institutions.  Some NFPFIs have converted to proprietary corporate 
form, for example through the demutualisation of building societies and insurers in 
Australia, Britain and New Zealand.  For a variety of reasons many NFPFIs have 
failed, for example many mutual savings and loan associations in the US (Mason, 
2004) and the Equitable Life Assurance Company in the UK (O’Brien, 2006). The 
demutualisation of the largest British building societies has been seen as a response to 
their inability to grow within the ‘movement’, hampered by constraints on 
management recruitment and remuneration arising from societies’ traditional reliance 
on internal labour markets (Klimecki & Willmott, 2009).  With hindsight, it is clear 
that these conversions shifted into the listed bank sector a number of institutions 
which appeared to have the management ambition, scale and business skills to survive 
as listed banks, but in reality lacked some or all of these. 
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 At least implicitly, all the articles in this special edition revisit the challenge 
identified by Hansmann (1996): if there is no perfect organisational form then the 
relative merits of different forms must be subject to evaluation.  We take no 
ideological stance and do not idealise not-for-profit organisational forms as an 
inevitably and unambiguously preferable alternative.  NFPFIs face the same challenge 
as other business organisations: in the long-run they must perform to the satisfaction 
of their stakeholders and governance issues must be managed effectively.  This will be 
particularly true in competitive markets in which failure to achieve at least a minimum 
level of cost-efficiency, or ensure customer experience comparable to that available 
from for-profit alternatives, would be expected to drive providers out of business. But 
at the same time, NFPFIs can be associated with unfavourable outcomes in the 
competitive environment. For instance, the not-for-profit organisational form can 
create barriers to exit and lead to other problems.  Reduced incentives for patrons to 
monitor effectively may lead to the over-accumulation of capital in inefficient or 
inefficiently large institutions (Hollis & Sweetman, 2007).  This may in turn generate 
pressures to demutualise, leading to greater risk-taking and the dissipation of excess 
capital.  Another exit barrier may be reduced market discipline – a non-profit or non-
dividend-paying institution needs only a relatively low level of profits or surplus to 
survive. 
 In summary, NFPFIs can be associated with competitive success and failure. It 
is the aim of this thematic collection of articles to promote their study, debate what 
makes them special and gauge their contribution to society. In the words of Sir 
Winston Churchill: ‘Success is not final, failure is not fatal: it is the courage to 





The response to the call for papers for this special edition provided further evidence 
that the study of NFPFIs is alive and well.  There were sufficient proposals to have 
filled this issue several times over, and our task in making selections was not an easy 
one.  Our objective was not to choose articles which argue for the superiority of a 
particular institutional form, nor to offer a balanced or comprehensive overview of the 
sector, but to provide a series of contributions based on original research and/or 
innovative analysis, which are theoretically informed and explain change over time 
rather than describing static conditions.  Several of the articles are explicitly novel in 
the choice of subject matter or methodology.  Others have benefited from the opening 
of archives or publication of records, which have presented new opportunities and 
allowed scholars to generate and address new questions as well as revisit older ones. 
 This special edition reflects the diversity of both business history and NFPFIs 
in presenting articles across a range of institutional types, countries and time periods, 
with different thematic, theoretical, and empirical perspectives.  In this section we 
briefly describe the individual contributions in the sequence in which they are 
presented.  For convenience Table 1 sets out the articles and in the next section we 
discuss a number of themes which link these articles.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 Geographically the articles deal with institutions in Australia, Palestine, Spain, 
the UK, the US, and a genuinely international institution, SWIFT.  There are, of 
necessity, obvious gaps in our selection – very few of the proposals we received 
related to the southern hemisphere or developing countries.  Several articles are 
studies of individual institutions, others deal with specific institutional types.  These 
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range from nineteenth century mutual insurance companies and savings institutions to 
twenty-first century providers of microcredit and international payments 
infrastructure.  Credit providers of various types are the dominant institutional form 
and the temporal focus of most of the articles is the twentieth century.    
 We start with two articles on insurance.  In the first of these, O’Brien and Fenn 
provide evidence on governance practices among mutual life insurers in nineteenth 
century Britain and compare their performance against proprietary companies.  They 
find that mutuals were larger than proprietary/stock companies and experienced much 
lower failure rates.  As we might anticipate, the success of mutuals was attributable in 
part to their ability to generate economies of scale.  They were able to create a 
virtuous circle, usually not charging commissions and so able to offer higher returns 
and attract more policyholders in a period before sophisticated risk management 
techniques were fully-developed.  Managerial diseconomies were kept in check by a 
broad variety of mechanisms, such as representation through elected members or 
bodies.  This article complements and extends various aspects of insurance history, for 
example: Pearson’s (2002) study of mutuality in eighteenth century fire insurance 
companies; Alborn’s (2009) study, a principal theme of which is the reduction of 
information asymmetries in life insurance; Johnson’s (2010) comparison of the 
performance of joint-stock and mutual life insurers; and the work on US insurers by 
Wright (2010a) and Wright and Smith (2004). 
 The Australian life insurance industry was long dominated by a small number 
of mutuals.  Keneley’s detailed study of one of these, the AMP, one of Australia’s 
largest and most enduring business organisations, shows how it moved gradually away 
from mutuality until its eventual final break through demutualisation.  This was no 
abrupt abandonment of mutuality, rather an evolution in which the professionalisation 
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of management, and changes in markets, regulation, technology and the commercial 
environment gradually shifted it away from its founding principles.  Keneley’s 
analysis suggests that demutualisation is the outcome of a complex process and 
provides a fresh look at a debate that, at least in the UK, was permeated by managerial 
and political themes (e.g. Barnes, 1984; Kay, 1991; Llewellyn, 1996; Llewellyn and 
Holmes, 1991).  Much of the literature on mutual and co-operative financial 
institutions stresses their cultural characteristics, as the institutions themselves and 
their advocates also frequently do.  Hansen (2007) analyses the transition of large 
Danish savings banks into commercial banks, emphasising how this process was 
influenced by shared historical narratives, which helped to shape their organisational 
culture and capabilities.  Keneley complements this article in demonstrating the same 
kind of ‘cultural shift’ in a major Australian mutual. 
 In the next article, Carbonell examines the development of Barcelona’s Montes 
de Piedad in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  These institutions were 
originally established throughout Europe by the Catholic church as charitable lenders, 
reliant on donations to fund lending on the security of pledged goods.  As in Samy 
(2001) and Colvin and McLaughlin (2011), Carbonell borrows ideas from the current 
microfinance debate to explore the emergence of retail financial practices during the 
first industrial revolution. She shows that there was no single path for amalgamations 
between individual montes and savings banks while, at the same time, arguing that 
these charitable institutions acted as a ‘buffer’ to help prevent individuals resorting to 
usurers, a role that was particularly important in Barcelona’s developing financial 
system during the economic and financial crisis of 1847-8. 
 Mason charts the evolution of organisational form in US thrifts from their 
beginnings in the early nineteenth century to the Great Depression.  Different forms 
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dominated in different parts of the country and time periods.  Eventually, federal 
regulation, under the powerful influence of commercial banks, forced change, 
although this was reinforced by pressures from within the ‘movement’ to 
professionalise and change organisational form.  These changes parallel the 
developments among US savings banks recently charted in this journal by Wadhwani 
(2011).  Both these studies demonstrate how the public objectives of these 
organisations led to restrictions on their powers which contributed to their long-term 
decline in the twentieth century. 
 Building societies, the British equivalent of the US thrifts, have attracted much 
less interest from business historians than banks and insurers.  But scholars have 
begun to exploit the archives of building societies and related sources (e.g. Bátiz-Lazo 
& Billings, 201x; Noguchi & Bátiz-Lazo, 2010; Samy, 2011).  In contrast to their US 
counterparts, British building societies enjoyed a remarkable expansion between the 
World Wars and Scott and Newton examine how a small group of societies emerged 
to dominate the movement during this period.  These societies built scale through 
organic growth and without resort to financial markets.  The authors use the archival 
records of a number of societies to examine their marketing activity, which they argue 
generated scale economies which were key to this growth.   Their article complements 
the recent work by Samy (2011), who identifies the principal beneficiaries of these 
changes as the institutions’ managers, who enjoyed relatively high remuneration and 
public profiles. 
 Koistinen shows how de facto NFPFIs acted as providers of development 
capital in the US after World War Two.  These development credit corporations 
(DCCs) were organised state-by-state and were constituted on a ‘for-profit’ basis, 
although were never expected to earn significant profits.  This was effectively a form 
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of surrogate regional policy practised by organisations established and funded by 
conventional financial institutions in response to political pressures arising from 
disappointing regional economic performance.  They may therefore have pre-empted 
the type of government intervention which in Britain led to the creation of the 
institutions which eventually formed 3i (Coopey & Clarke, 1995; Scott & Newton, 
2007). 
 Di Martino and Sarsour break new ground for this journal, and business 
history in general, in presenting an article on Palestine. They examine a microcredit 
institution (ACAD) in a setting so far almost completely ignored by business and 
economic historians.  Like Carbonell’s Montes de Piedad, ACAD has relied on 
donations to fund its lending activity.  In contrast to Carbonell’s case, these came from 
international donors.  ACAD’s reliance on these donors and high levels of bad debt 
among its customer base raise the question of whether this institution should be more 
properly considered a means of distributing aid than a commercial enterprise.  In these 
circumstances the agency problem is different from that of most of the other 
institutions featured in this issue: it is expected to fulfil an economic development role 
promoting social inclusion while operating under extreme conditions.   
 In the final article Scott and Zachariadis examine the development of SWIFT, 
the international interbank payments organisation, a key infrastructure element in the 
globalisation of financial markets.  Faced with the need for substantial capital 
investment to secure connectivity, reduce duplication and enforce standards, co-
operation was required in the banking community to create and operate a network for 
collective benefit.  This was achieved very successfully through an unusual cross-
border not-for-profit organisation in which participants co-operated to produce a 
standardised solution, a topic addressed recently in this journal in a very different 
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context by Velkar (2009).  The authors explain how this success came about and 
address concerns that it has constrained competition and innovation.  Their article 
complements a recent book on the VISA organisation (Stearns, 2011) and Crompton 
and Jupe’s (2007) article on the use of the ‘not-for-profit’ form in providing critical 
infrastructure in Britain’s privatised railway system.  In firmly connecting business 
history to the sociology of finance and the history of technology they also extend the 
international business history of financial institutions beyond the well-known 
perspectives of the self-standing company (Wilkins & Schröter, 1998) and banks as 




A number of common, often overlapping, themes emerge from the very different 
articles presented.  Some of these may be ‘old’ themes, but can appear in a new 
perspective when placed in an international and comparative context. 
 Unsurprisingly, governance is one of the key themes.  Business historians have 
been very active in recent years in exploring the diversity and complexity of corporate 
governance (notable contributions include, for example: Cheffins, 2008; Hannah, 
2007a, 2007b; Wright & Sylla, 2011).  The articles included here provide welcome 
insights outside the narrow range of enterprise governance arrangements in large listed 
companies, beyond which Herrigel (2007, pp. 481-482) encouraged scholars to 
venture. 
 O’Brien and Fenn illustrate the diversity of governance arrangements among 
nineteenth century British mutual insurers.  Keneley’s longitudinal study of the 
evolution of mutuality in the AMP addresses from a different perspective the question 
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of how mutual insurance models vary from company to company and over time.  Both 
articles deal with the rights to residual profits and control, key aspects of mutual 
governance. In several contributions (Carbonell; Di Martino & Sarsour; Keneley) the 
presence of many stakeholder groups led to a confusion of objectives, which is no 
surprise as the question of accountability in NFPFIs is a long-standing one.  In the 
AMP, which offered some products which did not confer membership or were 
dependent on the performance of the assets in which funds were invested, the 
contradictory interests of different customer groups ultimately contributed to 
demutualisation.  In ACAD, the potential conflict between commercial and 
development aims appears not yet to be resolved.  In several articles (Keneley; Mason; 
O’Brien & Fenn; Scott & Zachariadis) there is evident tension between the 
professionalisation of management, inevitable as institutions grow, and the owner-
manager agency problem which exists in both mutual and proprietary companies. 
 In several articles (Carbonell; Di Martino & Sarsour; Keneley) the 
organisations have at least some religious connection.  As in Colvin (2011), 
confessional orientation can act as a screening and monitoring device to cope with 
moral hazard and reduce risk faced by a lender or insurer.  The importance of 
overcoming asymmetric information problems in order to manage risk effectively is a 
challenge for all financial institutions, and is addressed in other recent scholarship on 
NFPFIs.  In part of a wider project, Guinnane and Streb (2011) address moral hazard 
in nineteenth century German insurance/benefit societies where small organisational 
size and members’ personal knowledge conferred informational advantages.  Gottleib 
(2007) and Murray (2007) studied US industrial sickness funds/insurance societies, 
finding that they enjoyed informational advantages in handling adverse selection and 
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moral hazard issues, arguably at the expense of wider access, until regulators 
repressed them during the Great Depression. 
 In Keneley’s AMP and Mason’s thrifts, changes in regulation hastened the 
transformation or demise of institutions founded and developed as NFPFIs.  This is 
not a new theme: Hansmann (1996, p. 5) noted that ‘governmental consumer 
protection regulation has often played a critical role in permitting investor-owned 
enterprise to vie with, and ultimately displace, cooperative, mutual, and nonprofit 
firms’. 
 Much discussion on NFPFIs focuses on their reliance on retained profits as 
their principal source of capital, with limited, or in some cases no, access to external 
capital markets.  Viswanathan and Cummins (2003) identified the need to raise capital 
as crucial in US insurance demutualisations in the 1980s and 1990s.  Michie (2011, 
pp. 313, 315-317) has criticised the post-financial crisis attitude of UK regulators to 
the inability of NFPFIs to raise external capital as one of the features of ‘pro-plc’ 
regulation.  But the evidence presented here suggests that this problem can be 
overcome where regulation and the imagination of ‘patrons’ permit.  In several articles 
NFPFIs used alternative mechanisms for raising capital: donations (Carbonell; Di 
Martino & Sarsour); equity and debt provided as a result of political pressures 
(Koistinen); various methods among mutual insurers (O’Brien & Fenn); and levies on 
the organisation’s members (Scott & Zachariadis). 
 The notion that NFPFIs create public goods is common to several articles.  
This was recognised by ‘patrons’, who provided capital, expertise or both, in the belief 
that the organisations studied represented a social response to market problems.  The 
nature of these public goods varied considerably.  Often this was the promotion of 
thrift in different contexts and by different means (Carbonell; Keneley; Mason; 
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O’Brien & Fenn; Scott & Newton). For the DCCs the contribution was to promote 
business growth in local economies, complementing the activities of the conventional 
lending institutions which were the DCCs’ financial sponsors, as well as forestalling 
unwelcome political interventions (Koistinen).  In SWIFT’s case, the public good was 
a technological network which supported an explosion in transaction numbers (Scott 
& Zachariadis).   
 Carbonell’s Montes de Piedad and Di Martino and Sarsour’s ACAD contribute 
to economic development, emerging to fill gaps in the provision of finance.  These are 
microcredit institutions, often seen as a form of socially responsible investment with 
financial values reinforcing social and cultural values.  Advances in microcredit, and 
microfinance more widely, have been hailed in recent years, but have long historical 
antecedents.  Microfinance’s growing maturity in some countries but absence from 
others can be puzzling; for example, Moyo’s (2009) controversial and fierce critique 
of international aid notes the absence of microfinance institutions from most African 
countries.  Microfinance is under attack in countries where it has been prominent 
recently: Bangladesh and India.  In the former, doubts have emerged over its lasting 
impact, and in the latter commercial providers, with the clear profit motive also 
typical in Latin America, have been attacked for charging interest rates which have 
made repayment difficult, although these rates may have been lower than those 
available from alternative sources.  Such issues raise potentially interesting questions 
for business historians, but must be dealt with elsewhere. 
 Another broad theme is that of innovation and entrepreneurship in meeting 
customer needs, developing and marketing new products and services, and in 
management and the deployment of technology as the basis for increasing 
organisational effectiveness, allowing NFPFIs to meet their objectives.  All the 
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contributions feature some form of innovation.  This is perhaps most obvious in the 
articles by Keneley and Scott and Zachariadis, whose organisations harnessed the 
information technologies of the third industrial revolution (Galambos, 2005).  
Carbonell’s Montes de Piedad, Di Martino and Sarsour’s ACAD, Mason’s thrifts and 
Koistinen’s DCCs all demonstrated innovation in developing their services, echoing 
the theme of innovation in catering to the needs of small savers recently explored by 
Maixé-Altés (2009) and Wadhwani (2011).  O’Brien and Fenn’s insurers innovated in 
the evaluation and management of risk, and Scott and Newton’s building societies in 
marketing. 
 Several of the contributions explore the boundaries between NFPFIs and for-
profit institutions, with whom they have competed, or whose services they have 
complemented, or for whom they have provided services.  The dividing line between 
‘for-profit’ and ‘not-for-profit’ financial institutions is less neat than legal form would 
imply and NFPFIs are not always as they may appear, as evidenced in the Lancashire 
terminating building societies investigated by Hart (2009).  Koistinen’s DCCs were 
constituted as for-profit companies but no returns were expected.  In contrast 
Keneley’s AMP was formed as a friendly society and eventually surrendered mutual 
form having concluded that this was incompatible with the changing environment in 
which it was operating.  Di Martino and Sarsour’s ACAD, as we have noted, is an 
unusual institution in that its reliance on donations has apparently freed it from the 
need to generate profits or surpluses, but forced it to rely on donors. 
 Finally, the Chandlerian concepts of critical scale and organisational 
capabilities (Chandler, 1962; 1977; 1990) are relevant to several articles, raising the 
frequently-asked question of the relationship between size and success (O’Brien & 
Fenn; Scott & Newton).  The articles by Mason and Scott & Newton deal with the 
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transformation of local or regional organisations into national organisations.  But size 




NFPFIs, organisational diversity and the study of financial crises 
Before concluding this introduction we would like to comment on the role of NFPFIs 
in the financial crisis of the late 2000s. There is a widely-held view that financial 
institutions owned by private shareholders rank amongst the most culpable in the 
recent financial debacle and that alternative forms of governance and ownership could 
contribute to superior long-term outcomes. Wright (2007) anticipated this debate, 
arguing that efficiency is not so much a function of ownership as it is of market 
structure (the more competitive the more efficient) and internal incentive alignment 
(the closer the more efficient).
4
 However, in spite of the continuing interest in the 
historical study of NFPFIs the latter were absent from recent special editions on 
financial crisis by business historians (Hansen, 2009; Kobrak & Wilkins, 2011) and 
even within the discourse of historians targeting the wider general public (e.g. 
Ferguson, 2009; Marichal, 2010).  
 The case for mutuals, not only in financial services, is robustly reiterated by 
Michie (2011), who draws on evidence from many countries.   Joint-stock companies 
have converted to mutuals before and Michie and Llewellyn (2010) proposed the 
remutualisation of failed institutions such as Northern Rock (although at the time of 
writing it appears that the UK government will divest itself of ownership via a more 
conventional route of privatisation).  Along similar lines, Co-operatives UK (2011) 
has proposed that the British post office, an important provider of financial services, 
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particularly to lower income groups, could be privatised as a mutual, arguing that this 
would be the most appropriate organisational form to support public service delivery. 
Supporters of such moves promote them on the basis of greater transparency and 
increasing accountability to stakeholders. However, British mutual building societies 
and the Spanish cajas have consolidated further, with both sectors continuing to 
shrink and increasing in concentration. Indeed, the cajas have been forced to raise 
capital through stock market flotations (a move in which the International Monetary 
Fund seems to have played an important role in advising the Spanish government).  
 The inadequacies of regulation, which both failed to prevent financial crisis 
and contributed to reduced diversity among financial institutions, strengthen the case 
for encouraging greater diversity.  Indeed, as several of the articles in this issue and 
various other authors (Hansmann, 1996; Murray, 2007; Wadhwani, 2011; Wright, 
2010a) argue, regulation has contributed to the long-term decline of NFPFIs.   
 But regulatory change is not solely responsible for the loss of organisational 
diversity.  Market forces are at work here too as seen in the broader debate on 
financialisation, in which many of the contributions question the nature of financial 
systems and institutions (Dore, 2008; Epstein, 2005).  One of the symptoms of 
financialisation has been the move of non-financial organisations to offer financial 
products and services whose accounting profitability exceeds that in core markets (see 
Bátiz-Lazo and Reese (2010) and references therein).  This has contributed to a 
homogenisation of organisational forms which has reduced diversity, thereby 
weakening the ‘ecology’ of the financial system.  Efforts to regenerate greater variety 
and complexity in organisational form might therefore contribute to a more robust 
financial system (Centre for Research on Socio Cultural Change, 2010; World 
Economic Forum, 2010). It is therefore argued that a strong mutual sector could 
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underpin enhanced financial stability and invigorate retail financial services: 
‘Different business models will drive innovation and competition’ claims Michie 
(2011, p. 313).   
 These arguments have led to expressions of political support for mutuality. In 
the UK, for example, government proposals for strengthening the financial system 
envisaged a greater role for a mutually-owned financial sector (HM Treasury, 2009; 
2010).  Statements by George Osborne, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Finch, 
2009), Lord Turner, chairman of the Financial Services Authority (BSA, 2010a), and 
Vincent Cable, the Business Secretary (BSA, 2010b), advocated a greater variety in 
the organisational ecology of the UK financial system. In Brazil, the central bank has 
given serious thought to the issue (da Silva, 2011). So far, in Britain at least, this has 
not translated into practical steps to bring ‘parity of esteem’ for mutual and proprietary 
models and equality of treatment in regulation and supervision. Some argue that this is 
because British regulators take the proprietary model as the norm and regard mutuals 
as a ‘deviation’ (Mutuo, 2010, pp. 6, 13).  
 In summary, there has been a loss of diversity in the organisational ecology of 
financial markets and this has been identified as one of the reasons for the acute nature 
of the financial crisis of the late 2000s. Mutuality of itself, of course, does not prevent 
problems in the financial sector but there is an opportunity for historians to contribute 
to this debate by providing empirical evidence which links organisational diversity, 





Business history is sometimes criticised for focusing too heavily on successes.  
Although most of the organisations investigated in this special edition can be 
considered successful in some way, this is not true of all of them for all of their 
history.  The articles therefore provide insights into the conditions in which the not-
for-profit organisational form may function well in the provision of financial services 
and how NFPFIs evolve to reflect the needs of the stakeholders and societies they 
serve.  In particular, such institutions are likely to be most successful when they have 
a clear purpose, although this may evolve over time, and may be compromised by the 
diversity of interests among stakeholder groups. 
 We have already noted the reduction in institutional diversity in the context of 
our discussion of financial crisis.  If we view crisis as at least in part a manifestation 
of the impact of long-term changes in the financial system, historians and other 
scholars should evaluate the relative performance of not-for-profit and joint-stock 
financial institutions in the years ahead of, and during, the financial crisis of the late 
2000s.  Inevitably governance will remain a rich field for historians and non-historians 
alike, and it will be important to investigate managerial behaviour, such as managers’ 
attitudes to risk-taking opportunities and the rewards for risk-taking.  But lack of 
archival access may constrain such research and suggest other approaches. 
 At a basic level, this special edition has provided a platform for theoretically 
informed studies of NFPFIs grounded in the wider business history literature, 
addressing ‘the main aim of business history ... to study and explain the behaviour of 
the firm over long periods of time, and place the conclusions in a broader framework 
of the markets and institutions in which that behaviour occurs’ (Wilson, 1995, p. 1).  
But in our view these articles go beyond this and collectively deal with ‘big themes’ 
such as the novelty of microfinance, demutualisation, comparative performance with 
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proprietary models, the role of NFPFIs in economic development, and the role of 
information technology, and thereby ‘provide a dynamic insight into the evolution of 
capitalism, bringing a comparative element to the field which can draw on material 
from firms, industries or national groupings of businessmen’ (Wilson, 1995, pp. 1-2).  
To paraphrase Mark Twain, ‘reports of the death of the non-profit have been greatly 
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1
 Basri and Khalid (2011, p. 3) note that numerous terms are used to describe non-
profit organisations including independent, third sector, voluntary, charitable, 
philanthropic, social, public, faith-based, tax-exempt, non-governmental or civil 
society.  
2
 Across Europe many NFPFIs use retained earnings to fund social activities within 
their communities.  This brings them closer to the character of NGOs than trade-
based, for-profit, commercial organisations. Although quite diverse in nature, these 
expenditures have a positive impact on society and thus provide legitimacy for the 
organisations’ continued existence and operations. 
3
 Information asymmetries of two sorts impact on financial institutions: on the one 
hand, savers are uncertain about whether managers have adequate skills to ensure the 
security of their funds and, on the other hand, institutions are uncertain about the 
ability of borrowers to repay.  In a series of articles, Guinnane (1997; 2001; 2003) 
documented how German credit co-operatives addressed such problems.  The 
challenges to the individual institution of ‘effectively managing its activities and 
communicating to outsiders that it is, in fact, well run’ (Guinnane, 2003, p. 235) were 
met by reliance on internal labour markets to develop local managers, able to forge 
long-term customer relationships.  These were augmented by regional banks to offset 
liquidity problems and regional auditing associations to monitor management to 
enhance public confidence. 
4
 Wright (2010b) exposes these arguments to a wider audience. 
